<Previous Section>
<Next Section>

46 六反第四十六

畏死〔遠〕難,降北之民也,而世尊之曰「貴生之士」。學道立方,離法之民也, 而世尊之曰「文學之士」。遊居厚養,牟食之民也,而世尊之曰「有能之士」。語曲牟知, 偽詐之民也,而世尊之曰「辯智之士」。行劍攻殺,暴憿之民也,而世尊之曰「磏勇之士」。 活賊匿姦,當死之民也,而世尊之曰「任譽之士」。此六民者,世之所譽也。

赴險殉誠, 死節之民,而世少之曰「失計之民」也。寡聞從令,全法之民也,而世少之曰「樸陋之民」也。 力作而食,生利之民也,而世少之曰「寡能之民」也。嘉厚純粹,整穀之民也,而世少之曰「愚戇之民」也。 重命畏事,尊上之民也,而世少之曰「怯懾之民」也。挫賊遏姦,明上之民也,而世少之曰「讇讒之民」也。 此六民者,世之所毀也。

姦偽無益之民六,而世譽之如彼;耕戰有益之民六,而世毀之如此, 此之謂六反。

布衣循私利而譽之,世主聽虛聲而禮之,禮之所在,利必加焉。百姓循私害而訾之, 世主壅於俗而賤之,賤之所在,害必加焉。故名賞在乎私惡當罪之民,而毀害在乎公善宜賞之士, 索國之富強,不可得也。

古者有諺曰:「為政猶沐也,雖有棄髮,必為之。」愛棄髮之費而忘長髮之利, 不知權者也。

夫彈痤者痛,飲藥者苦,為苦憊之故不彈痤飲藥,則身不活,病不已矣。

今上下之接,無子父之澤,而欲以行義禁下,則交必有郄矣。且父母之於子也,產男則相賀, 產女則殺之。此俱出父母之懷衽,然男子受賀,女子殺之者,慮其後便,計之長利也。 故父母之於子也,猶用計算之心以相待也,而況無父子之澤乎?

今學者之說人主也,皆去求利之心,出相愛之道,是求人主之過父母之親也, 此不熟於論恩,詐而誣也,故明〔主〕不受也。聖人之治也,審於法禁,法禁明著, 則官(法)〔治〕;必於賞罰,賞罰不阿,則民用。(官)〔民用〕官治則國富, 國富則兵強,而霸王之業成矣。霸王者,人主之大利也。人主挾大利以聽治, 故其任官者當能,其賞罰無私。使士民明焉,盡力致死,則功伐可立而爵祿可致, 爵祿致而富貴之業成矣。富貴者,人臣之大利也。人臣挾大利以從事,故其行危至死, 其力盡而不望。此謂君不仁,臣不忠,則(不)可以霸王矣。

夫姦必知則備,必誅則止;不知則肆,不誅則行。夫陳輕貨於幽隱,雖曾、史可疑也; 懸百金於市,雖大盜不取也。不知,則曾、史可疑於幽隱;必知,則大盜不取懸金於市。

故明主之治國也,眾其守而重其罪,使民以法禁而不以廉止。母之愛子也倍父,父令之行於子者十母; 吏之於民無愛,令之行於民也萬父。母積愛而令窮,吏〔用〕威嚴而民聽從,嚴愛之筴亦可決矣。

且父母之所以求於子也,動作則欲其安利也,行身則欲其遠罪也。君上之於民也,有難則用其死, 安平則盡其力。親以厚愛關子於安利而不聽,君以無愛利求民之死力而令行。明主知之, 故不養恩愛之心,而增威嚴之勢。故母厚愛處,子多敗,推愛也。父薄愛教笞,子多善,用嚴也。

今家人之治產也,相忍以飢寒,相強以勞苦,雖犯軍旅之難,飢饉之患, 溫衣美食者,必是家也。相憐以衣食,相惠以佚樂,天飢歲荒,嫁妻賣子者,必是家也。 故法之為道,前苦而長利;仁之為道,偷樂而後窮。聖人權其輕重,出其大利,故用法之相忍, 而棄仁人之相憐也。學者之言皆曰「輕〔刑〕」,此亂亡之術也。凡賞罰之(心)〔必〕者, 勸禁也。賞厚則所欲之得也疾,罰重則所(惠)〔惡〕之禁也急。夫欲利者必惡害,害者, 利之反也。反於所欲,焉得無惡?欲治者必惡亂,亂者,治之反也。是故欲治甚者,其賞必厚矣; 其惡亂甚者,其罰必重矣。今取於輕刑者,其惡亂不甚也,其欲治又不甚也。此非特無術也, 又乃無行。是故決賢、不肖、愚、知之(美)〔筴〕,在賞罰之輕重。

且夫重刑者,非為罪人也。 明主之法,揆也。治賊,非治所(揆)〔治〕也,〔治〕所(揆)〔治〕也者,是治死人也。 刑盜,非治所刑也;治所刑也者,是治胥靡也。故曰:重一姦之罪而止境內之邪,此所以為治也。 重罰者,盜賊也,而悼懼者,良民也。欲治者奚疑於重刑(名)!

若夫厚賞者,非獨賞功也, 又勸一國。受賞者甘利,未賞者慕業,是報一人之功而勸境內之眾也,欲治者何疑於厚賞!

今不知治者皆曰:「重刑傷民,輕刑可以止姦,何必於重哉?」此不察於治者也。夫以重止者, 未必以輕止也;以輕止者,必以重止矣。是以上設重刑者而姦盡止,姦盡止,則此奚傷於民也?

所謂重刑者,姦之所利者細,而上之所加焉者大也。民不以小利加大罪,故姦必止者也。 所謂輕刑者,姦之所利者大,上之所加焉者小也。民慕其利而傲其罪,故姦不止也。故先聖有諺曰: 「不躓於山,而躓於垤。」山者大,故人順之;垤微小,故人易之也。今輕刑罰,民必易之。 犯而不誅,是驅國而棄之也;犯而誅之,是為民設陷也。是故輕罪者,民之垤也。是以輕罪之為民道也, 非亂國也,則設民陷也,此則可謂傷民矣。

今學者皆道書筴之頌語,不察當世之實事,曰:「上不愛民,賦斂常重, 則用不足而下(恐)〔怨〕上,故天下大亂。」此以為足其財用以加愛焉,雖輕刑罰,可以治也。 此言不然矣。凡人之取重(賞)罰,固已足之之後也。雖財用足而後厚愛之,然而輕刑,猶之亂也。

夫富家之愛子,財貨足用。財貨足用則輕用,輕用則侈泰。親愛之則不忍,不忍則驕恣。侈泰則家貧, 驕恣則行暴。此雖財用足而愛厚,輕(利)〔刑〕之患也。

凡人之生也,財用足則隳於用力, 上懦則肆於為非。財用足而力作者,神農也;上治懦而行脩者,曾、史也,夫民之不及神農、曾、史亦明矣。

老聃有言曰:「知足不辱,知止不殆。」夫以殆辱之故而不求於足之外者,老聃也。今以為足民而可以治, 是以民為皆如老聃也。故桀貴在天子而不足於尊,富有四海之內而不足於寶。君人者雖足民, 不能足使為(君)天子,而桀未必〔以〕為天子為足也,則雖足民,何可以為治也?故明主之治國也, 適其時事以致財物,論其稅賦以均貧富,厚其爵祿以盡賢能,重其刑罰以禁姦邪,使民以力得富, 以事致貴,以過受罪,以功致賞,而不念慈惠之賜,此帝王之政也。

人皆寐,則盲者不知;皆嘿,則喑者不知。覺而使之視,問而使之對, 則喑盲者窮矣。不聽其言也,則無術者不知;不任其身也,則不肖者不知。聽其言而求其當, 任其身而責其功,則無術不肖者窮矣。夫欲得力士而聽其自言,雖庸人與烏獲不可別也; 授之以鼎俎,則罷健效矣。故官職者,能士之鼎俎也,任之以事而愚智分矣。故無術者得於不用, 不肖者得於不任。

言不用而自文以為辯,身不任(者)而自飾以為高,世主眩其辯, 濫其高而尊貴之,是不須視而定明也,不待對而定辯也,喑盲者不得矣。明主聽其言必責其用, 觀其行必求其功,然則虛舊之學不談,矜誣之行不飾矣。

Chapter XLVI. Six Contrarieties1

Who fears death and shuns difficulty, is the type of citizen who would surrender or retreat, but the world reveres him by calling him "a life-valuing gentleman". Who studies the ways of the early kings and propounds theories of his own, is the type of citizen that would neglect the law, but the world reveres him by calling him "a cultured and learned gentleman". Who idles his time away and obtains big awards, is the type of citizen who would live on charities, but the world reveres him by calling him "a talented gentleman". Who twists his speeches and pretends to erudition, is the fraudulent and deceitful type of citizen, but the world reveres him by calling him "an eloquent and intelligent gentleman". Who brandishes his sword and attacks and kills, is the violent and savage type of citizen, but the world reveres him by calling him "a hardy and courageous gentleman". Who saves thieves and hides culprits, is the type of citizen that deserves the death penalty, but the world reveres him by calling him "a chivalrous and honourable gentleman". These six types of citizens are what the world praises.

Who would venture risks and die in the cause of loyalty, is the type of citizen that chooses death before infidelity, but the world despises him by calling him "a planless subject". Who learns little but obeys orders, is the law-abiding type of citizen, but the world despises him by calling him "a naive and rustic subject". Who works hard and earns his livelihood, is the productive type of citizen, but the world despises him by calling him "a small-talented subject". Who is frank, generous, pure, and genuine, is the right and good type of citizen, but the world despises him by calling him "a foolish and silly subject". Who esteems commands and reveres public affairs, is the superior-respecting type of citizen, but the world despises him by calling him "a cowardly and fainthearted subject". Who suppresses thieves and oppresses culprits, is the superior-obeying type of citizen, but the world despises him by calling him "a flattering and slanderous subject". These six types of citizens are what the world blames.

Thus, the wicked, fraudulent, and useless citizens include six types, but the world praises them in those manners; so do the tilling, fighting, and useful citizens include six types, but the world blames them in these manners. These are called "six contrarieties".

If the hemp-clothed commoners in accordance with their private interests praise people, and if the lord of this age believing in bubble reputations respects them, then whoever is respected, will be accorded profits. If the hundred surnames on account of private feud with them slander them, and if the lord of this age, as misled by the beaten track of men, despises them, then whoever is despised, will suffer damage. Therefore, fame and rewards will go to selfish, vicious citizens deserving punishment; while blame and damages will befall public-spirited, upright gentlemen deserving reward. If so, then to strive for the wealth and strength of the state is impossible.

The ancients had a proverb saying: "To govern the people is like washing one's head. Though there are falling hairs, the washing must needs be done." Whoever regrets the waste of the falling hairs and forgets the gain of the growing hairs, does not know the doctrine of expediency. 2

Indeed, opening boils causes pain; taking drugs causes bitter taste. Yet, if boils are not opened on account of pain and drugs not taken on account of bitterness, the person will not live and the disease will not stop.

Now the relationship between superior and inferior involves no affection of father and son, if anyone wishes to rule the inferiors by practising righteousness, the relationship will certainly have cracks. Besides, parents in relation to children, when males are born, congratulate each other, and, when females are born, lessen 3 the care of them. Equally coming out from the bosoms and lapels of the parents, why should boys receive congratulations while girls are ill-treated? Because parents consider their future conveniences and calculate their permanent benefits. Thus, even parents in relation to children use the calculating mind in treating them, how much more should those who have no affection of parent and child?

The learned men of to-day, on counselling the lord of men, all persuade him to discard the profit-seeking mind and follow the way of mutual love. Thereby they demand more from the lord of men than from parents. Such is an immature view of human relationships: it is both deceitful and fallacious. Naturally the enlightened sovereign would not accept it. The sage, in governing the people, deliberates upon laws and prohibitions. When laws and prohibitions are clear and manifest, all officials will be in good order. 4 He makes reward and punishment definite. When reward and punishment are never unjust, the people will attend to public duties. If the people attend to public duties and officials are in good order, 5 then the state will become rich; if the state is rich, then the army will become strong. In consequence, hegemony will be attained. The enterprise of the Hegemonic Ruler is the highest goal of the lord of men. With this highest goal in view the lord of men attends to governmental affairs. Therefore, the officials he appoints to office must have the required abilities, and the rewards and punishments he enforces must involve no selfishness but manifest public justice to gentry and commoners. Whoever exerts his strength and risks his life, will be able to accomplish merits and attain rank and bounty. When rank and bounty have been attained, the enterprise of wealth and nobility will be accomplished. Now, wealth and nobility constitute the highest goal of the ministers. With this highest goal in view the ministers attend to their official duties. Therefore, they will work hard at the peril of their lives and never resent even the exhaustion of their energy. This amounts to the saying that if the ruler is not benevolent and the ministers are not loyal, hegemony cannot be attained.

Indeed, the culprits, if infallibly detected, would take precautions; if definitely censured, they would stop. If not detected, they would become dissolute; if not censured, they would become active. For illustration, when cheap articles are left at a deserted spot, even Tsêng Shan and Shih Ch`in can be suspected of stealing them; whereas when a hundred pieces of gold hang at the market-place, even the greatest robber dare not take them. Even Tsêng Shan and Shih Ch`in are liable to suspicion at a deserted spot if detection is unlikely; if sure to be found out, the greatest robber dare not touch the gold hanging at the market-place.

Therefore, the enlightened sovereign in governing the state would increase custodians and intensify penalties and make the people stop vices according to law but not owing to their own sense of integrity. For illustration, mothers love children twice as much as fathers do, but a father enforces orders among children ten times better than a mother does. Similarly, officials have no love for the people, but they enforce orders among the people ten thousand times better than their parents do. Parents heap up their love but their orders come to naught; whereas officials exercise force and the people obey them. Thus, you can easily make the choice between severity and affection.

Furthermore, what parents desire of children is safety and prosperity in livelihood and innocence in conduct. What the ruler requires of his subjects, however, is to demand their lives in case of emergency and exhaust their energy in time of peace. Now, parents, who love their children and wish 6 them safety and prosperity, are not listened to; whereas the ruler, who neither loves nor benefits his subjects but demands their death and toil, can enforce his orders. As the enlightened sovereign knows this principle, he does not cultivate the feeling of favour and love, but extends his influence of authority and severity. Mothers love sons with deep love, but most of the sons are spoilt, for their love is over-extended; fathers show their sons less love and teach them with light bamboos, 7 but most of the sons turn out well, for severity is applied.

If any family of to-day, in making property, share hunger and cold together and endure toil and pain with one another, it would be such a family that can enjoy warm clothes and nice food in time of warfare and famine. On the contrary, those who help one another with clothing and food and amuse one another with entertainments, would become such families that give wives in marriage and set children for sale in time of famine and during the year of drought. Thus, law as the way to order may cause gain at first, but will give gain in the long run; whereas benevolence as the way to order may give pleasure for the moment, but will become fruitless in the end. Measuring their relative weights and choosing the one for the greatest good, the sage would adopt the legal way of mutual perseverance and discard the benevolent 8 way of mutual pity. The teachings of the learned men all say, "Mitigate penalties". This is the means of inviting turmoil and ruin. In general, the definiteness of reward and punishment is based on encouragement and prohibition. If rewards are liberal, it is easy to get what the superior wants; if punishments are heavy, it is easy to forbid what the superior hates. Indeed, whoever wants benefit, hates injury, which is the opposite of benefit. Then how can there be no hatred for the opposite of the wanted? Similarly, whoever wants order, hates chaos, which is the opposite of order. For this reason, who wants order urgently, his rewards must be liberal; who hates chaos badly, his punishments must be heavy. Now, those who apply light penalties are neither serious in hating chaos nor serious in wanting order. Such people are both tactless and helpless. Therefore, the distinction 9 between the worthy and the unworthy, between the stupid and the intelligent, 10 depends on whether reward and punishment are light or heavy.

Moreover, heavy penalties are not for the sole purpose of punishing criminals. The law of the intelligent sovereign, in suppressing rebels, is not disciplining only those who are being suppressed, for to discipline only the suppressed is the same as to discipline dead men only 11 ; in penalizing robbers, it is not disciplining only those who are being penalized, for to discipline only the penalized is the same as to discipline convicts only. Hence the saying: "Take seriously one culprit's crime and suppress all wickednesses within the boundaries." This is the way to attain order. For the heavily punished are robbers, but the terrified and trembling are good people. Therefore, why should those who want order doubt the efficacy of heavy penalties?

Indeed, liberal rewards are meant not only to reward men of merit but also to encourage the whole state. The rewarded enjoy the benefits; those not as yet rewarded look forward to their future accomplishment. This is to requite one man for his merit and to encourage the whole populace within the boundaries. Therefore, why should those who want order doubt the efficacy of liberal rewards?

Now, those who do not know the right way to order all say: "Heavy penalties injure the people. Light penalties can suppress villainy. Then why should heavy penalties be necessary?" Such speakers are really not well versed in the principles of order. To be sure, what is stopped by heavy penalties is not necessarily stopped by light penalties; but what is stopped by light penalties is always stopped by heavy penalties. For this reason, where the superior sets up heavy penalties, there all culprits disappear. If all culprits disappear, how can the application of heavy penalties be detrimental to the people?

In the light of the so-called "heavy penalties", what the culprits can gain, is slight, but what the superior inflicts, is great. As the people never venture a big penalty for the sake of a small gain, malefactions will eventually disappear. In the face of the so-called "light penalties", however, what the culprits gain, is great, but what the superior inflicts, is slight. As the people long for the profit and ignore the slight punishment, malefactions never will disappear. Thus, the early sages had a proverb, saying: "Nobody stumbles against a mountain, but everybody trips over an ant-hill." The mountain being large, everyone takes notice 12 of it; the ant-hill being small, everyone disregards it. Now supposing penalties were light, people would disregard them. To let criminals go unpunished is to drive the whole state to the neglect of all penalties; to censure criminals properly is to set traps for the people. Thus, light punishment is an ant-hill to the people. For this reason, the policy 13 of light punishment would either plunge the state into confusion or set traps for the people. Such a policy may thus be said to be detrimental to the people.

The learned men of to-day, one and all, cite the panegyrics in the classics, and, without observing closely the real facts, of the present age, say: "If the superior does not love the people and always levies exactions and taxations, then living expenses will become insufficient and the inferiors will hate 14 the superior. Hence the chaos in the world." This means that if the superior lets the people have enough money to spend and loves them besides, then notwithstanding light punishment order can be attained. Such a saying is not true. Generally speaking, men incur heavy punishment 15 only after they have had enough money. Therefore, though you let them have enough money to spend and love them dearly, yet light penalties cannot get them out of disorder.

Take, for example, the beloved sons of wealthy families, who are given sufficient money to spend. Having sufficient money to spend, they spend it freely. Spending money freely, they indulge in extravagance. The parents, loving them so much, cannot bear to restrict them. Not restricted, they become self-willed. Being extravagant, they impoverish their families. Being self-willed, they practise violence. Such is the calamity of deep love and light penalty, even though there is enough money to spend.

Men as a whole, while living, if they have enough money to spend, do not use energy; if the superior's rule is weak, they indulge in doing wrong. He who has enough money to spend and yet still exerts himself strenuously, can be nobody but Shên-nung. Those who cultivate their conduct though the superior's rule is weak, can be nobody but Tsêng Shan and Shih Ch`iu. Clearly enough, indeed, the masses of people cannot live up to the levels of Shên-nung, Tsêng Shan and Shih Ch`iu.

Lao Tan 16 said: "Who knows how to be content, gets no humiliation, who knows where to stop, risks no vitiation." 17 Indeed, who on account of vitiation and humiliation seeks nothing other than contentment, can be nobody but Lao Tan. Now, to think that by contenting the people order can be attained is to assume everybody to be like Lao Tan. For illustration, Chieh, having the dignity of the Son of Heaven, was not content with the honour; and, having the riches within the four seas, was not content with the treasures. The ruler of men, though able to content the people, cannot content all of them with the dignity of the Son of Heaven while men like Chieh would not necessarily be content with the dignity of the Son of Heaven. If so, even though the ruler might attempt to content the people, how could order be attained? Therefore, the intelligent sovereign, when governing the state, suits his policy to the time and the affairs so as to increase his financial resources, calculates taxes and tributes so as to equalize the poor and the rich, extends ranks and bounties for the people so as to exert their wisdom and ability, enlarges penal implements so as to forbid villainy and wickedness, and makes the people secure riches by virtue of their own efforts, receive punishments owing to their criminal offences, get rewards by performing meritorious services, and never think of any gift by beneficence and favour. Such is the course of imperial and kingly government.

If all men are asleep, no blind man will be noticed; if all men remain silent, no mute will be detected. Awake them and ask each one to see, or question them and ask each one to reply. Then both the blind and the mute will be at a loss. Likewise, unless their speeches be heeded, the tactless will not be known; unless appointed to office, the unworthy will not be known. Heed their speeches and seek their truth; appoint them to office and hold them responsible for the results of their work. Then both the tactless and the unworthy would be at a loss. Indeed, when you want to get wrestlers but merely listen to their own words, then you cannot distinguish between a mediocre man and Wu Huo. Given tripods and bowls, then both the weak and the strong come to the fore. Similarly, official posts are the tripods and bowls to able men. Entrusted with affairs, the stupid and the intelligent will be differentiated. As a result, the tactless will not be used; the unworthy will not be appointed to office.

Nowadays, those who find their words not adopted, pretend to eloquence by twisting their sentences; those who are not appointed to office, pretend to refinement by disguising themselves. Beguiled by their eloquence and deceived by their refinement, the sovereigns of this age honour and esteem them. This is to tell the bright without finding their sight and to tell the eloquent without finding their replies, wherefore the blind and the mute never will be detected. Contrary to this, the intelligent sovereign, whenever he listens to any speech, would hold it accountable for its utility, and when he observes any deed, would seek for its merit. If so, empty and obsolete learning cannot be discussed and praised and fraudulent action cannot be disguised.

Notes

1. 六反. Its English rendering by L. T. Chen is "Six Contradictions" (Liang, op. cit., p. 126, f. 1).

2. 權. The doctrine of expediency is peculiarly utilitarian: The end justifies any means. It is what the Confucians abhorred most and the Legalists practised best.

3. With Hirazawa 殺 here does not mean "kill" but 減 "lessen" or "subtract."

4. With Ku Kuang-ts`ê 法 should be 洽.

5. With Ku 官官治 should be 民用官治.

6. With Kao Hêng 關 above 子 means 置 or 措.

7. Used in punishing criminals and mischievous children.

8. With Ku Kuang-ts`ê 人 below 仁 is superfluous.

9. With Ku 美 should be 分.

10. With Ku 知 should be 智.

11. According to Yü Yüeh the original of this passage should be 明主之法也揆賊非治所揆也治所揆也者是治死人也。

12. With Ku Kuang-ts`ê 順 should read 愼.

13. With Wang Hsien-shen 民 above 道 is superfluous.

14. With Ku and Wang 恐 is a mistake for 怨.

15. With Wang Wei 賞 should be 刑.

16. Lao Tzŭ's appellation.

17. v. Lao Tzŭ's Tao Tah Ching, Chap. XLIV.

<Previous Section>
<Next Section>
IATHPublished by The Institute for Advanced Technology in the Humanities, © Copyright 2003 by Anne Kinney and the University of Virginia